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Inferences about speech acts are often conditional, non-monotonic, and involve the issue
of time. Most agent communication languages, however, ignore these issues, due to the
diﬃculty to combine them in a single formalism. This paper addresses such issues in
defeasible logic, and shows how to express a semantics for ACLs in order to make non-
monotonic inferences on the basis of speech acts.
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1. Introduction
FIPA Semantic Language or FIPA SL is a popular language introduced by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
(FIPA) to describe the meaning of speech acts in terms of pre- and postconditions on mental attitudes [8]. Alternative
traditions deﬁne the pre- and postconditions on social commitments, or unify both approaches using the same FIPA SL to
describe the dynamics of the so-called public mental attitudes associated with the communication roles [6]. However, the
drawback of FIPA SL is that it only partially speciﬁes the meaning of the speech acts. For example, it does not specify how
mental attitudes persist in time, and the informal speciﬁcation refers to agent properties like trustworthiness, but these
properties are not represented in the formal language FIPA SL. Therefore other semantic languages have been proposed to
describe the meaning of speech acts, such as epistemic dynamic logic [30].
The research question of this paper is to fully describe the pre- and postconditions of speech acts in a formal language,
such that if an agent observes a sequence of speech acts, this agent can use the formal language and calculate the resulting
state. Thus the formal language should be computationally eﬃcient and unambiguous. For example, if the trustworthiness
of agents is relevant for the resulting state, then the trustworthiness of the agents should be incorporated in the language.
Moreover, the language should be expressive enough to reason about the most common patterns, in particular it should
represent and reason about temporal phenomena, and it should be able to deal with common sense or non-monotonic
reasoning.
We propose a defeasible logic (DL) extended with time and modal operators as representation language and reasoning
mechanism to formalize speech acts. The main advantages of DL are that
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ing with many different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning [1]; hence, it allows us to capture the non-monotonic
behaviour of speech acts [19];
• DL has a linear complexity [25] and has also eﬃcient implementations [3,22,24]; this computational result can be
extended to DL with time and modalities, since it is possible to compute the extension of a temporal defeasible theory
in time linear to the size of the theory;
• Signiﬁcant extensions of DL have incorporated various modal operators in order to model cognitive agents [17,16];
• DL has been extended to capture the temporal aspects, such as persistence, of several speciﬁc phenomena, like legal
positions [21], legal modiﬁcations [15,20,18], and deadlines [14]; this framework for temporal persistence can adjusted
to model the persistent and transient nature of speech acts and their effects.
To some extent some of these features (i.e., non-monotonicity and temporal persistence) are also enjoyed by Event
Calculus [23]. However, DL has some advantages over Event Calculus. It is not possible for Event Calculus to compute all
conclusions of a theory in time linear to the size of the theory. Furthermore, eﬃcient implementations exist for defeasible
logic [3,24], also when modalities [22,24] and time [27,28] are added.
We consider the following success guidelines for our formal language and the representation of speech acts:
Calculate the effect of speech acts such that agents can determine the state in which they are, given the history of a se-
quence of speech acts;
Deﬁne agent types and dialogue types as respectively a set of formulas and a set rules of the language;
What if analysis of speech acts for the planning of agents of new speech acts (dialogue generation);
Modularity of the formalization of the consequences of speech acts, distinguish public from private mental attitudes, deﬁne
modules for agent types and dialogue types.
FIPA Communicative Act Library Speciﬁcation [8] deﬁnes not only the speech act itself, it additionally models the content,
e.g.: a request speech act has an action in the content ﬁeld. In request-when the content ﬁeld holds another speech act. The
expressivity of such content ﬁelds easily reaches ﬁrst-order logic (plus modal operators). This is a problem if an agent wants
to do reasoning about such a message, but this topic is outside the scope of the paper.
Moreover, in this paper we are not going to develop from scratch a new logic, but we use and adjust an existing one (DL
with time). Moreover, we are not going to introduce a new approach to agent communication, but we use an existing one
(role based communication unifying mental attitudes and social commitments approaches). Our contribution in this paper is
in the use of the language to represent and reason about agent communication. We do not consider full planning of speech
acts, which is left for further research.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some motivations and examples from different applicative
scenarios which are not easy to deal with in the current approaches. In Section 3, a variant of Temporal Defeasible Logic
(TDL) is proposed to model FIPA speech acts. Section 4 shows how the TDL formalism can express the semantics for ACLs.
Related work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude and present some directions for future work.
2. Non-monotonicity, persistence and rules in dialogues
In this section we introduce some motivations and examples from different applicative scenarios which are not easy to
deal with in the current approaches.
It is widely accepted that the FIPA semantics for Agent Communication Languages (ACL) has some ﬂaws [33]. First, the
semantics is expressed in terms of private mental attitudes of agents. Therefore, it cannot be veriﬁed given common assump-
tions about agent systems. Second, the sincerity condition assumed in FIPA may be acceptable in cooperative circumstances,
but is clearly wrong for persuasion and negotiation dialogues. Two solutions for these ﬂaws have been discussed:
• An ACL semantics can be given in terms of social attitudes, like commitments [31,29]. Social attitudes are maintained
in public, as a kind of common data structure.
• An ACL semantics can be given in terms of public mental attitudes instead of private ones. This preserves the character-
istics of the BDI-approach that underlies the FIPA semantics, without incurring the veriﬁability problems. Thus, [11,12],
for instance, use the notion of common ground, [26] refers to ostensible beliefs and goals and [5,6] introduce public
roles.
These solutions fail to consider other problems, which emerge when new application domains are considered: in partic-
ular, ACL semantics
• do not specify how to deal with non-monotonicity in communicative actions;
• mostly ignore the problem of time, i.e., the possibility of timing the different aspects of communication, and the persis-
tence of preconditions and effects.
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1. Consider an interactive application to persuade buyers, arguing with a user:
Seller: Why don’t you buy a Mercedes A class? It is safe.
Buyer: I heard that it may roll over.
Seller: Yes, maybe it is not safe in that sense, but I know that you are not a driver who takes risks.
In this example, the seller has to retract his assertion on the safety of the product and to make a weaker one. Re-
traction makes inference about communicative actions non-monotonic. When retraction is possible, it is no longer true
that every larger set of speech acts supports the same conclusions as its subsets. In this sense, FIPA-ACL semantics is
monotonic, while social commitment approaches rarely deal with the propositional content of the speech acts.
2. Consider a debate with a politician, staged on Second Life. The application will record the assertions of the politician
and will check automatically its coherence, to coerce him not to contradict himself. Among other things, the politician
says that he is against alcohol abuse. The day after, you read on the news forum, that he was caught while driving
drunk. You have to revise your conclusion that he really believed what he said online, but his public claims cannot be
revised. Similar issues arise when deciding to trust a vendor in e-commerce; initially you may trust a vendor at face
value, but after some unpleasant experiences, you will have to revise your beliefs.
FIPA’s main problem is the unveriﬁability of private mental states on which the semantics is based. To solve this,
approaches like [11,12,26,4–6] distinguish public and private mental attitudes, but they fail to consider the defeasible
connection between them. Hence, the concept of non-monotonicity plays a role here, too.
Monotonic inferences about effects and preconditions of communicative acts are only possible regarding the public
beliefs or goals of the participants (if at all), while inferences about the private beliefs of the participants can be made
only by default, under the assumption of cooperativity, trust or sincerity. It is not possible to model a dialogue on
the basis of private beliefs and goals only: public mental states are needed since in many situations dialogues go on
correctly, even if the participants are not cooperative, sincere or do not trust each other.
3. ACL semantics like FIPA, do not in general allow explicitly to make inferences about the success of a rational effect,
even though informally the FIPA speciﬁcation (p. 10) says: “Whether or not the receiver does, indeed, adopt belief in the
proposition will be a function of the receiver’s trust in the sincerity and reliability of the sender.” In many circumstances
the speaker can in fact attribute to the hearer the proposition he has asserted, though in a defeasible way. For example,
in collaborative situations when he knows that the hearer considers him reliable, or in persuasion dialogues when the
hearer does not challenge claim. However, when a claim is in fact challenged, or when the circumstances turn out to
be hostile instead of cooperative, such initial inferences of ‘success’, have to be retracted.
Time and persistence.
4. In an e-dispute, a legal case is debated. Suppose Ian sells at time 2 a faulty children’s chair to John, causing John’s
child to get hurt. It is legally presumed that when a vendor sells a product, he acts in good faith, i.e., as if he were
informing the client that the product is without faults. A witness, Kay, reveals at time 3 to John that the vendor had
independently informed her at time 1 that the chair was faulty. Assume that the sincerity precondition of an ‘inform’
act persists into the future, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Given this assumption, we have at times 2 and 3
two conﬂicting vendor’s beliefs about the quality of the chair and two conﬂicting client’s beliefs about the same.
ACL approaches like FIPA generally do not model the persistence of preconditions into the future, let alone into the past.
5. Consider an e-commerce application, in which an agent makes an offer or a proposal. How long does the offer persist?
Is the offer still valid after a refusal? Commitment based approaches like [10] deal with this by means of a ﬁnite state
machine describing the state of a commitment. Typically, a proposal will persist, until it is either accepted or rejected.
FIPA, instead, ignores whether the effect of a speech act will persist or not.
6. Consider instead an application to make a user cooperate. What happens to a request? Does it persist like a proposal?
Probably it does not: if a request is not ‘taken on’, it just passes away. For the same reason time is made explicit in
the Contract Net Protocol. There is a deadline on responses to the call for proposals (CFP) speech act which requests a
proposal from bidders. So apparently, the CFP only ‘persists’ until the deadline.
7. Finally, in a newsfeed service we would like to have some quality of service warranties about the timing of the in-
formation. Suppose I want to be informed about all stock exchange data of Air France. I expect an inform about any
changes in the value of Air France, as soon as possible after the actual change occurred. Else, we get a kind of ‘temporal
insincerity’ of the newsfeed agent.
3. Temporal defeasible logic
This paper provides a computational-oriented approach to describe the behaviour of FIPA speech acts. We are interested
in modelling their non-monotonic character, their temporal aspects and the persistence of their preconditions and effects.
In this section we propose a variant of Temporal Defeasible Logic (TDL), which extends and modiﬁes the logic of [21] in
order to model FIPA speech acts.
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Standard DL is based on a formal language which is usually propositional and consists of a set of literals, namely a set
of propositional statements and their negations. In other words, once deﬁned a set Prop= {p,q, . . .} of propositional atoms,
a literal l is a member p of Prop or its negation ¬p. By convention, given a literal l, the complement ∼l is ¬p if l = p, and p
if l = ¬p.
To accommodate the cognitive and temporal aspects of the speech acts we need to develop a suitable variant of DL
(Temporal Defeasible Logic, TDL) which enriches the basic language of standard DL with the following elements:
• a discrete totally ordered set of instants of time T = {t0, t1, t2, . . .};
• a set of agents Ag= {a,b, . . .};
• a set of agent roles Role= {r1, r2, . . .} (given x ∈ Ag we use r(x) ∈ Role to denote the role played by agent x);
• the families of modal operators Bel= {Bx}x∈Ag∪Role (for belief) and Goal= {Gx}x∈Ag∪Role (for goal);
• a set of speech act types ST = {inform,promise, . . .}.
Based on the above elements a modal literal is an expression Xtl (or its negation, i.e., ¬Xtl) where X is a modal operator,
t ∈ T and l is either a literal or a modal literal. For example, the expression BtaGt′r(b)p means that agent a believes at t that
the goal of the role played by agent b at time t′ is (was, will be) p.
A speech act is an expression sti, j(s, t) or the negation of it (i.e., ¬sti, j(s, t)), where i, j ∈ Ag ∪ Role, s is either a literal,
a speech act, or a modal literal, st ∈ ST , and t ∈ T . For example, the expression informr(a),r(b)(p, t) means that agent a, in
her role, informs at time t agent b, in his role, that p is the case. (Note that we assume that the iteration of modal operators
and speech acts is ﬁnite.)
On account of the above extension, the notion of complement must be extended as well. The complement of a literal l
will denote the set of literals that are in conﬂict with l. If l is any type of literal, C (l) denotes the complement of l, i.e., the
set of literals that cannot hold when l does. Thus C (l) is deﬁned as follows:
• if l = p ∈ Prop, then C (l) = {¬p};
• if l = ¬p ∈ Prop, then C (l) = {p};
• if l = Xtm, such that X ∈ ST ∪ Bel∪Goal and m is either a literal or a modal literal, then C (l) = {Xtn | n ∈ C (m)} ∪
{¬Xtm};
• if l = ¬Xtm, such that X ∈ ST ∪ Bel∪Goal and m is either a literal or a modal literal, then C (l) = {Xtn | n ∈ C (m)} ∪
{Xtm}.
Hereafter, we will use Xt p to denote any modal literal holding at time t or any speech act sti, j(p, t). A rule is an expression
lbl : A ↪→x m, where lbl is a unique label of the rule, A is a (possibly empty) set of speech acts and modal literals, ↪→∈
{→,⇒,}, m is either a speech act or a modal literal, and x is either π or τ signaling whether we have a persistent or
transient rule. Strict rules, marked by the arrow →, support indisputable conclusions whenever their antecedents, too, are
indisputable. Defeasible rules, marked by ⇒, can be defeated by contrary evidence. Defeaters, marked by , cannot lead to
any conclusion but are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. A persistent rule is a
rule whose conclusion holds at all instants of time after the conclusion has been derived, unless interrupting events occur;
transient rules establish the conclusion only for a speciﬁc instant of time. Thus, ex1 : B5a p ⇒π G6r(a)q means that if agent a at
time 5 believes p, then, defeasibly, the role played by agent a has the goal q at time 6 and the goal continues to hold after 6
until some event overrides the goal of q. If we change π into τ the resulting rule ex2 : B5a p ⇒τ G6r(a)q means that r(a) has
the goal q at time 6, but we do not know whether the goal will persist after 6. Note that we assume that defeaters are only
transient: if a persistent defeasible conclusion, such as G5a p is blocked at time 6 by a transient defeater Aτ ¬G6a p, such a
conclusion no longer holds after 6 unless another applicable rule reinstates it (for the details, see below, Section 3.2).
We will use some abbreviations. Given a rule r and a set R of rules, A(r) denotes the antecedent of r while C(r) denotes
its consequent; Rπ denotes the set of persistent rules in R , and R[ψ] the set of rules with consequent ψ . Rs , Rsd and Rdft
are respectively the set of strict rules, the set of strict and defeasible rules, and the set of defeaters in R .
3.2. Proof theory
There are in TDL three kinds of features: facts, rules, and a superiority relation among rules. Facts are indisputable
statements, represented by modal literals and speech acts. The superiority relation (	) provides information about the
relative strength of rules, i.e., about which rules can overrule which other rules. A knowledge base that consists of these
items is called a TDL theory.
Deﬁnition 1. A TDL theory is a structure (F , R,	), where
• F is a ﬁnite set of facts,
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• 	 is an acyclic binary relation over R .
TDL is based on a constructive inference mechanism based on tagged conclusions. Proof tags indicate the strength and the
type of conclusions. The strength depends on whether conclusions are indisputable (the tag is ), namely, obtained by
using facts and strict rules, or they are defeasible (the tag is ∂). The type depends on whether conclusions are obtained by
applying a persistent or a transient rule: hence, conclusions are also tagged with π (persistent) or τ (transient).
Provability is deﬁned below and is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in a TDL theory D .
Deﬁnition 2. Given a TDL theory D , a proof P from D is a ﬁnite sequence of tagged modal literals or speech acts such that:
(1) Each tag is one of the following: +π , −π , +∂π , −∂π , +τ , −τ , +∂τ , −∂τ ;
(2) The proof conditions Deﬁnite Provability (Positive), Deﬁnite Provability (Negative), Defeasible Provability (Positive), and Defea-
sible Provability (Negative) given below are satisﬁed by the sequence P .
Given a proof P we use P (n) to denote the nth element of the sequence, and P [1..n] denotes the ﬁrst n elements of P .
The meaning of the proof tags is a follows:
• +π Xtp p (resp. +τ Xtp p): we have a deﬁnite derivation (i.e., a proof using only strict rules and facts) of Xp holding
from time tp onwards (resp. of Xp holding at tp);
• −π Xtp p (resp. −τ Xtp p): we can show that it is not possible to have a deﬁnite derivation of Xp holding from time
tp onwards (resp. of Xp holding at tp);
• +∂π Xtp p (resp. +∂τ Xtp p): we have a defeasible derivation of Xp holding from time tp onwards (resp. of Xp holding
at tp);
• −∂π Xtp p (resp. −∂τ Xtp p): we can show that it is not possible to have a defeasible derivation of Xp holding from time
tp onwards (resp. of Xp holding at tp).
Let us now provide the proof conditions corresponding to the above proof tags.
Deﬁnite provability (positive).
If P (n+ 1) = +x Xtp p, then
(1) Xtp p ∈ F if x= τ ; or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rxs [Xt
′
p p] such that ∀Y taa ∈ A(r): +yY taa ∈ P [1..n]
where:
(a) y ∈ {π,τ };
(b) if x= π , then t′p  tp ;
(c) if x= τ , then t′p = tp .
If the conclusion is transient (x = τ ), the above conditions are basically the standard ones for deﬁnite proofs in DL,
which are just monotonic derivations using forward chaining. If the conclusion is persistent (x= π ), Xp can be obtained at
tp or, by persistence, at any time t′p before tp . Finally, notice that facts lead to strict conclusions, but are taken not to be
persistent.
Example 1. Consider this theory:
(
F = {informr(a),r(b)(p, tp)
}
, R = {informr(a),r(b)(p, tp) →π Btpr(a)p
}
, 	= ∅)
We can derive +π Btpr(a)p, and +π Btr(a)p for t > tp .
Defeasible provability (positive).
If P (n+ 1) = +∂x Xtp p, then
(1) +x Xtp p ∈ P [1..n] or
(2) ∀l ∈ C (Xtp p), −xl ∈ P [1..n], and
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rxsd[Xt
′
p p] such that
∀Y taa ∈ A(r): +∂ zY taa ∈ P [1..n], and
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(2.2.1) ∃Y tbb ∈ A(s),−∂ zY tbb ∈ P [1..n] or
(2.2.2) ∃w ∈ R y[Xtp p] such that
∀Y tc c ∈ A(w): +∂ zY tc c ∈ P [1..n] and w 	 s, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R y[¬Xt∼p p] ∪ R y[Xt∼pn], where n ∈ C (p), either
(2.3.1) ∃Y tbb ∈ A(s),−∂ zY tbb ∈ P [1..n] or
(2.3.2) ∃w ∈ R y[Xt∼p p] such that
∀Y tc c ∈ A(w): +∂ zY tc c ∈ P [1..n] and w 	 s
where
(i) y, z ∈ {π,τ };
(ii) if x= π , then t′p  t∼p  tp ;
(iii) if x= τ , then t′p = t∼p = tp .
Defeasible derivations run in three phases. In the ﬁrst phase we put forward a supported reason (rule) for the conclusion
we want to prove. Then in the second phase we consider all possible (actual and potential) reasons against the desired
conclusion. Finally in the last phase, we have to rebut all the counterarguments. This can be done in two ways: we can
show that some of the premises of a counterargument do not obtain, or we can show that the argument is weaker than
an argument in favour of the conclusion. If x = τ , the above conditions are essentially those for defeasible derivations in
DL. If x = π , a proof for Xtp p can be obtained by using a persistent rule which leads to Xp holding at tp or at any time t′p
before tp . In addition, for every instant of time between the t′p and tp , p should not be terminated. This requires that all
possible attacks were not triggered (clauses 2.2.1 and 2.3.1) or are weaker than some reasons in favour of the persistence
of Xp (clauses 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). Notice that clause (2.2) takes into account all possible attacks at the present time, while
clause (2.3) considers attacks in the past. The idea of (2.3) is that the conclusion was proved as persistent in the past and
that all the attacks from then to now have been defeated at the time of the attack.
The inference conditions for negative proof tags (− and −∂), here below, are derived from the inference conditions for
the corresponding positive proof tags by applying the Principle of Strong Negation introduced by [2]. The strong negation
of a formula is closely related to the function that simpliﬁes a formula by moving all negations to an innermost position in
the resulting formula and replaces the positive tags with the respective negative tags and vice versa.
Deﬁnite provability (negative).
If P (n+ 1) = −x Xtp p, then
(1) Xtp p /∈ F if x= τ ; and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rxs [Xt
′
p p]: ∃Y taa ∈ A(r): −yY taa ∈ P [1..n].
where:
(a) y ∈ {π,τ };
(b) if x= π , then t′p  tp ;
(c) if x= τ , then t′p = tp .
Defeasible provability (negative).
If P (n+ 1) = −∂x Xtp p, then
(1) −x Xtp p ∈ P [1..n] and either
(2) ∃l ∈ C (Xtp p),+xl ∈ P [1..n] or
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rxsd[Xt
′
p p]:
∃Y taa ∈ A(r): −∂ yY taa ∈ P [1..n], or
(2.2) ∃s ∈ R y[l], where l ∈ C (Xtp p), such that
(2.2.1) ∀Y tbb ∈ A(s),+∂ zY tbb ∈ P [1..n] and
(2.2.2) ∀w ∈ R y[Xtp p]:
∃Y tc c ∈ A(w): −∂ zY tc c ∈ P [1..n] or w  s, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R y[¬Xt∼p p] ∪ R y[Xt∼pn], where n ∈ C (p), such that
(2.3.1) ∀Y tbb ∈ A(s),+∂ zY tbb ∈ P [1..n] and
(2.3.2) ∀w ∈ R y[Xt∼p p]:
∃Y tc c ∈ A(w): −∂ zY tc c ∈ P [1..n] or w  s
280 G. Boella et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 274–288where
(i) y, z ∈ {π,τ };
(ii) if x= π , then t′p  t∼p  tp ;
(iii) if x= τ , then t′p = t∼p = tp .
As we have already said the conditions for the negative proof tags are derived from the conditions for the corresponding
positive proof tag. In general the inference conditions for a negative proof tag explore all the possibilities to derive a literal
(with a given proof strength) before stating that the literal is not provable (with the same proof strength). Thus conclusions
with these tags are the outcome of a constructive proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot be obtained.
Example 2. Consider the following theory.
(
F = {informr(a),r(b)(p, t1),Gt3a q, Bt3r(a)c,Gt4b Bt4a d
}
,
R = {r1 : informr(a),r(b)(p, t1) ⇒π Bt1a p,
r2 :G
t3
a q ⇒π Bt3a ¬p,
r3 : B
t3
r(a)cτ Bt3a p,
r4 : G
t4
b B
t4
a d ⇒τ ¬Bt4a p
}
,
	= {r3 	 r2, r1 	 r4}
)
At time t1, r1 is the only applicable rule; accordingly we derive +∂π Bt1a p. At time t2 no rule is applicable, and the only
derivation permitted is the derivation of +∂π Bt2a p by persistence. At time t3 both r2 and r3 are applicable, but r4 is not. If r2
prevailed, then it would terminate Bap. However, it is rebutted by r3, so we derive +∂π Bt3a p. Finally at time t4, rule r4 is
applicable, thus we derive +∂τ¬Bt4a p and −∂π Bt4a p, which means that r4 terminates Bap. Notice that, even if r4 is weaker
than r1, the latter is not applicable at t4, thus it does not offer any support to maintain Bap.
Proposition 1. Let D be a TDL theory. For every # ∈ {,∂}, x, y ∈ {π,τ }:
• it is not the case that D  +#x Xt p and D  −#y Xt p;
• if D  +∂x Xt p and D  +∂ yl, such that l ∈ C (Xt p), then D  +x Xt p and D  +yl.
Proof (sketch). The proof is a trivial variation of the ones for Theorems 1 and 2 in [16]: the properties of Proposition 1 are
in fact a consequence of the use of the principle of strong negation for the deﬁnition of the proof conditions. 
Proposition 1 shows the soundness of TDL: it is not possible to derive a tagged conclusion and its opposite, and that we
cannot defeasibly prove both p and its complementary unless the deﬁnite (monotonic) part of the theory proves them; this
means that inconsistency can be derived only if the theory we started with is inconsistent, and even in this case the logic
does not collapse to the trivial extensions (i.e., everything is provable).
Deﬁnition 3. Let HBD be the Herbrand Base for a TDL theory D . The extension of D is the 4-tuple (+,−, ∂+, ∂−), where
#± = {Xt p | Xp ∈ HBD , D  ±#x Xt p, t ∈ T }, # ∈ {,∂}, and x ∈ {π,τ }.
Theorem 1. Given a TDL theory D, the extension of D can be computed in linear time, i.e., O (|R| ∗ |HBD | ∗ |TD |), where TD is the set
of distinct instants occurring in D.
Proof (sketch). Theorem 1 follows from the result for the extension with modal operators of [17] (to handle the set of
conﬂicting literals) and the result for the logic of [21] given in [19] to handle persistence of temporal literals. In particular,
since the current logic does not devise any procedure for introducing modalities (they are derived insofar as they are already
explicitly included in the head of rules) and temporal persistence is calculated focusing only on the temporal parameter
labeling the modality in the outermost position, the computation of the theory extension falls within the case analyzed
in [19] where the complexity is linear. 
4. Reasoning about speech acts in FIPA semantics
We now show how TDL formalism can express the semantics for ACLs. For ease of reference, let us focus on FIPA’s inform
and take [9] as a starting point. In FIPA, the meaning of communicative acts is deﬁned in terms of rational effects (REs) and
feasibility preconditions (FPs). The REs are the mental states the speaker wants to bring about in the hearer, and the FPs
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communicative act:
〈
a, inform(b, p)
〉
FP: B(a, p) ∧ ¬B(a, B(b, p) ∨ B(b,¬p))
RE: B(b, p)
As a feasibility precondition speaker a must believe what he says and he must not believe that hearer b already has an
opinion on the conveyed proposition. The rational effect is that hearer b comes to believe p.
Operators like this can be used to generate a dialogue directly, but they can also be used in the interpretation of the
utterances of the interlocutor. In FIPA, this methodology relies on axioms ([9], Properties 4 and 5) according to which, when
a communicative act is executed, its FPs are assumed to be true, and its RE is wanted by the speaker2:
B
(
a,done(act) → FP(act))
B
(
a,done(act) ∧ agent(b,act)) → G(b,RE(act))
FIPA and most other ACL semantics do not specify some important aspects of communicative acts, such as temporal persis-
tence and non-monotonicity, also with reference to the role based semantics to deal with private vs public mental attitudes.
Persistence. In the case of inform, e.g., hearer b can infer not only that the precondition that a believes p is true at the
moment of execution of the communicative act, b can also infer that this precondition held some time before the com-
municative act, and will hold afterwards. For instance, the content of an inform is supposed to persist, but a suggestion
evaporates, when it is not taken on.
Non-monotonicity. An inform speech act has effects on the public beliefs of the speaker. However, the speaker can later retract
its utterance, thus retracting its effects as well. This means that the utterance of an inform is done only in a defeasible way,
so that it can be retracted later.
Roles. The rational effect of a speech act can be successful or not, which does not only depend on the speaker, but also on
the hearer. ACL semantics like FIPA do not allow explicitly to make inferences about the success of a rational effect, since the
mental attitudes that are modeled, are the private ones of the agents. To solve this, we adopt [4–6]’s role-based approach to
agent communication, where mental attitudes are publicly attributed to dialogue participants, and can only change according
to the rules of the dialogue. Public beliefs and goals represent the expected behavior of an agent, associated with a role in
the dialogue. The public nature of the mental attitudes of roles solves the veriﬁability problem. Moreover, each participant
can engage in different dialogues at the same time by playing different roles, and dialogues can obey different kinds of
rules associated with each role. For example, in a persuasion dialogue, the proponent of a proposition can have a different
‘burden of proof’ than the opponent.
In the rules below, the beliefs and goals are therefore attributed to the roles (e.g., Br(a)), and not only to the individual
agents (e.g., Ba). Attitudes of individual agents can be unknown, or can be different from the attitudes publicly attributed
to their roles. Doing so, a lie is captured by deriving the conclusions +∂Br(a)γ (assuming that it is obtained as an FP of the
inform act with respect to p) and +∂Baδ where δ ∈ C (γ ).
We deﬁne different dialogue types and agent types [7], which can be used to model different types of dialogues. Concern-
ing agent types, they regulate the way a hearer interprets the dialogue from the point of view of the interaction between
public and private beliefs and goals of the speaker and the hearer. Speech acts have effects on the public mental attitudes
of the speaker only. To infer that these effects (defeasibly) hold for the private mental attitudes of the speaker and/or the
public or private beliefs and goals of the hearer further assumptions by the hearer are necessary:
• Sincerity: the speaker really believes or wants privately the beliefs or goals which can be publicly attributed to him on
the basis of his utterances.
• Reliability: the public beliefs of the speaker become public beliefs of the hearer.
• Trust: the public beliefs of the hearer which have been adopted on the basis of the public beliefs of the speaker become
the private beliefs of the hearer.
• Cooperativity: the public goals of the hearer which have been adopted on the basis of the public goals of the speaker
become the private goals of the hearer.
Agent types are different combinations of these assumptions. Agent types are used in the interpretation of a speech act
by a hearer, and in the planning phase of the speaker, who can foresee what will be the effects of his speech acts depending
on the agent type the hearer attributes to him.
Different dialogue types are modelled as different sets of rules to interpret speech acts. As we show below, rules are used
to derive what follows from a given speech act. However, not all the rules can be used at the same time, but only those
2 In FIPA notation, act stands for any action, done(act) is the proposition that expresses completion of act, and agent(b,act) represents that b is the agent
who executes action act.
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that the addressee of an inform does not have an opinion concerning what is said, from persuasive dialogues, where this
assumption does not hold and the addressee is assumed to publicly believe an assertion if he does not challenge it.
These two mechanisms meet the second success guideline.
In the following we present the rules in a modular way, to satisfy the last success guideline of Section 1, distinguishing
the following components:
1. Uttering and retracting,
2. Feasibility preconditions and rational effects,
3. Success conditions,
4. Bridge to private mental attitudes.
4.1. Inform
Rules Rinf = {i1, i2, i3, . . . , i14} (see below) deﬁne the meaning of an inform communicative act, for a standard type of
cooperative dialogue, like information exchange, where one agent is supposed to know more than the other. Adding also
rule i2 allows us to capture situations where the knowledge is more symmetric. In what follows, a,b are agents, r(a) and
r(b) the role-playing-agents in the dialogue, inform is a speech act type, s is either a literal or a modal literal, and t < t′ are
time points in T . Rules are prioritized as follows: 	inf = {i2 	 i1, i8 	 i7, i10 	 i9, i12 	 i11, i14 	 i13}.
Uttering and retracting an inform. Rule i1 describes how an inform act is performed by an agent a through an utterance event.
The rule is defeasible since the communicative act can be retracted later, as indicated in rule i2. There are different ways
of handling retraction. The solution is to withdraw the original communicative act by means of a defeater. This means that
all the consequences that can be inferred from the act, expressed in rules i3–i6, are also withdrawn. If we would take the
alternative solution of only retracting the content of the inform, we would need additional explicit rules to withdraw those
consequences too.
i1 uttera,b
(
informr(a),r(b)(s, t), t
) ⇒τ informr(a),r(b)(s, t)
i2 retracta,b
(
informr(a),r(b)(s, t), t
′)τ ¬informr(a),r(b)(s, t)
The agent of actions utter and retract is the individual agent a and not his role r(a). The rules i1 and i2 are used to connect
individual agents to their roles. These rules are non-persistent, since the action of uttering only temporally coincides with
execution of an inform communicative act. If the agent makes an inform at a given time, it is not possible to infer that it is
making the inform again at the next time instant.
The defeasible character of i1 is necessary in applications where an agent is trying to persuade the other one and the
other one can reply (see item 1 in Section 2), or where two agents are trying to cooperatively ﬁnd a solution and to advance
arguments which are probed by the other one. In these types of dialogues the speaker can retract his assertions to avoid
a contradiction. In information gathering scenarios like the ones considered by FIPA this is not necessary, since an agent is
supposed to know more than the other.
Feasibility preconditions and rational effects. Rules i3–i5 represent the FPs of inform. Following Properties 4 and 5 of [9], they
are interpreted as strict rules. Only rule i3 is persistent towards the future, since its effect is not affected by the consequent
of other rules. Instead, since the inform possibly changes the beliefs of the hearer b, i4–i5 are not persistent and they refer
to the situation before the execution of the speech acts:
i3 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) →π Btr(a)s
i4 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) →τ ¬Bt−1r(b)s
i5 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) →τ ¬Bt−1r(b)l
where l ∈ C (s). Note that the beliefs in the consequent of the rules are not attributed to the agents as private beliefs, but
to the roles they play: thus they have a public character.3
Rule i6 represents the RE of inform: its propositional content is embedded in a goal of the speaker that the hearer
believes it:
i6 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) →π Gtr(a)Btr(b)s
3 The conclusions of FP rules could also persist from the past, since they are observations and are not caused by the speech acts. For example, we may
infer that the speaker believed s in the past, and, unless other information are available, that this belief holds by persistence at t as well. This inference
is non-monotonic. In addition, the past time from when this belief starts to hold cannot be determined by the time of inform, but comes from additional
evidence, such as the time of another public belief of the speaker related to s. Facts like this can be easily embedded within our framework by adding
further suitable rules expressing this evidence.
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information exchange Rinf , rule i7 can represent that the hearer publicly adopts the information conveyed, if he does not
believe that the speaker is unreliable:
i7 Gtr(a)B
t
r(b)s ⇒π Btr(b)s
i8 Gtr(a)B
t
r(b)s, B
t
r(b)¬reliable(a)τ ¬Btr(b)s
Bridge to private mental attitudes. It is not necessary that the hearer privately believes what was said. Only if there is no
evidence to the contrary, we assume that individual agents believe what their roles believe (i9–i12). Rule i9 assumes that
the speaker individually believes what he says, unless he is believed to be insincere (i10). Rule i11 assumes sincerity for
goals in a similar way. Rule i13 assumes that a hearer believes what has been asserted, unless he is believed not to be a
trusting character (i14).
In all these cases, the cooperative behavior is the default, but it can be overruled by evidence to the contrary. Hence we
have i10 	 i9, i12 	 i11 and i14 	 i13.
i9 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) ⇒π Btas
i10 informr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬Btas
i11 informr(a),r(b)(s, t),G
t
r(a)B
t
r(b)s ⇒π GtaBtbs
i12 informr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬GtaBtbs
i13 informr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)s ⇒π Btbs
i14 informr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)s, B
t
r(a)¬trusting(b)τ ¬Btbs
Strict inferences about REs and FPs of communicative acts are only possible regarding the public beliefs or goals of the
participants, while inferences about the private mental states of the participants can be made only by default. Sincerity,
trust and cooperativity are the assumptions to pass information from the public level to the private one.
In the following we present some examples of reasoning about time and persistence, to illustrate the mechanism before
considering the rules of dialogue.
Example 3 (Time and persistence; see item 4 in Section 2). Consider the agents i (Ian), j (John) and k (Kay): their the roles are
v(i) (vendor), c( j) (client) and w(k) (witness). Literal s means “the chair is without faults”. The theory contains Rinf , 	inf ,
plus the following facts and additional rules:
Facts: utteri,k(informv(i),w(k)(¬s,1),1), sell(i, j,2),
B3c( j)(reliable(k)), utterk, j(informw(k),c( j)(¬s,3),3)
Rules: l1: sell(v(i), c( j),2) ⇒τ informv(i),c( j)(s,2)
l2: sell(v(i), c( j),2) ⇒π B2c( j)(reliable(i))
l3 :⇒π B2j¬reliable(i)
l4: B2j¬reliable(i) ⇒π B2c( j)¬reliable(i)
Priorities: l2 	 l4.
l1 states that when v( j) sells the chair at 2, he acts as if he were informing c( j) that the chair is without faults; l3 assumes
that j normally believes that i is unreliable and then, via rule l4, that j as a client believes so. However, j believes that i is
reliable when he is a vendor selling items: this overrides the fact that in general j believes the opposite (rule l2 is stronger
than l4).
Consider the relevant derivations in Table 1. For conclusions 7–8 and 11–12, due to the persistence of B1v(i)¬s and B2c( j)s,
these beliefs should also hold, respectively, at 2 and 3. But they are defeated by opposite arguments, which are in turn
defeated by the former ones. (TDL is a sceptical non-monotonic formalism: with two conﬂicting defeasible conclusions DL
refrains to take a decision.) 7–8 show that FPs of some inform acts are violated, 11–12 that some REs are not successful.
Example 4 (Multiple inform). Consider the situation where the agent a, in his role, informs at time 1 agent b in her role
about the fact s. Later, at time 3, agent a, again in his role, informs another agent c in her role about the same fact s.
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The relevant derivations of Example 3.
Time Conclusion Argument
1 1. +∂τ informv(i),w(k)(¬s,1) (a1): Facts, i1
1 2. + ∂π B1v(i)¬s (a2): 1, i3
2 3. + ∂τ informv(i),c( j)(s,2) (a3): Facts, l1
2 4. + ∂π B2j¬reliable(i) (a4): l3
2 5. + ∂π B2c( j)(reliable(i)) (a5): Facts,l2
2 6. − ∂π B2c( j)¬reliable(i) (a6): conﬂict between l2 and l4
2 7. + ∂πG2v(i)B2c( j)s (a7): 3, i6
2 8. + ∂π B2c( j)s (a8): 7, i7
2 9. − ∂π B2v(i)¬s (a9): conﬂict between (a2) and 3, i3
2 10. − ∂π B2v(i)s (a10): conﬂict between (a2) and 3, i3
3 11. +∂τ informw(k),c( j)(¬s,3) (a11): Facts, i1
3 12. + ∂πG3w(k)B3c( j)¬s (a12): 11, i6
3 13. − ∂π B3c( j)¬s (a13): conﬂict between (a6) and Facts, 12, i7
3 14. − ∂π B3c( j)s (a14): conﬂict between (a6) and Facts, 12, i7
Assume, however, that r(c) believes that a is not sincere. An interesting aspect of this scenario can be modeled by the
following theory, which contains two instances of the same rules i9 and i104:
(
F = { informr(a),r(b)(s,1), informr(a),r(c)(s,3), B3r(c)¬sincere(a)
}
,
R = { i′9 : informr(a),r(b)(s,1) ⇒π B1a s,
i′10 : informr(a),r(b)(s,1), B1r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬B1a s,
i′′9 : informr(a),r(c)(s,3) ⇒π B3a s,
i′′10 : informr(a),r(c)(s,3), B
3
r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬B3a s},
	= {i′10 	 i′9, i′′10 	 i′′9, i′10 	 i′′9, i′′10 	 i′9
})
The ﬁrst speech act triggers i′9, which is not blocked by i′10 since this last rule is not applicable. Hence, we get +∂π B1a s and,
by persistence, also +∂π B2a s. At time 3, rule i′′9 is triggered together with i′′10: since all instances of i10 are stronger than all
instances of i9, we terminate the persistence of Bas: hence, we have no longer suﬃcient reasons to say that a believes that s
is the case, and so we get −∂π B3a s. This should not look strange: c’s belief that a is not sincere is a publicly attributed belief
(the belief regards r(c)) and, in presence of this subsequent public evidence, we have reasons to undermine the previous
inference: before time 3 there were good reasons to think that a believed that s (there was no evidence to the contrary),
but this does not hold from 3 onwards. Of course, different logical arrangements can be made, such as removing the general
priority between i9 and i10 (which affects all rule instances) and adjust things case by case and in each concrete context, in
such a way that different instances of the pair i9–i10 may behave differently. For example, if we think that r(c)’s beliefs are
not reliable, we could simply change 	 and rather have i′′9 	 i′10, with which we would still obtain +∂π B3a s.
Example 5 (What if analysis and agent types). Assume agent i wants that j knows that s, not just as a public admission,
but that j really believe s privately. To achieve this goal i plans an inform speech act, in the role s (speaker) addressed to
receiver j. However, to understand whether he has possibilities to achieve it, i must consider also the agent type that j
attributes to him. The agent type is ATs( j),r(i) = {reliable(i), sincere(i), trusting( j)}. From this agent type, i can infer that j
will accept privately that s.
Facts: utteri, j(informs(i),r( j)(s,1),1),
B1r( j)(reliable(i)), B
1
r( j)(sincere(i)), B
1
s(i)(trusting( j)).
Suppose, however, that, similarly to what we had in Example 3, the following rules hold:
Rules: x1 :⇒π B1j¬reliable(i)
x2: B1j¬reliable(i) ⇒π B1c( j)¬reliable(i)
x3 :⇒π B1j¬sincere(i)
x4: B1j¬sincere(i) ⇒π B1c( j)¬sincere(i)
x5 :⇒π B1i ¬trusting( j)
x6: B1i ¬trusting( j) ⇒π B1s(i)¬trusting( j)
4 For brevity’s sake, let us omit utterances involving rule i1 and assume to have the inform speech acts as facts.
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The relevant derivations of Example 5.
Time Conclusion Argument
1 1. +∂τ informs(i),r( j)(s,1) (a1): Facts, i1
1 2. +∂π B1s(i)s (a2): 1, i3
1 3. +∂π B1r( j)(reliable(i)) (a3): Facts
1 4. +∂πG1s(i)B1r( j)s (a4): 1, i6
1 5. +∂π B1r( j)s (a5): 4, i7
1 6. +∂π B1i s (a6): 1, i9
1 7. +∂π G1i B1j s (a7): 1, 4, i11
1 8. +∂π B1j s (a8): 1, 5, i13
Table 3
The relevant derivations of Example 6.
Time Conclusion Argument
2 1. + ∂π B2j¬s (a1): l4, persistence
2 2. − ∂π B2j s (a2): conﬂict between l4 and i13
2 3. + ∂τ informr( j),s(i)(¬s,2) (a3): Facts, i1
2 4. + ∂π B2r( j)¬s (a4): 3, i3
2 5. + ∂π B2s(i)(reliable( j)) (a5): Facts
2 6. + ∂πG2r( j)B2s(i)s (a6): 3, i6
2 7. + ∂π B2r( j)s (a7): 6, i7
2 8. + ∂π B2i ¬s (a8): l3, persistence
3 9. + ∂π retracts(i),r( j)(informs(i),r( j)(s,1),3) (a9): Facts
3 10. − ∂τ informs(i),r( j)(s,1) (a10): conﬂict between i1 and i2
3 11. − ∂π B1s(i)s (a11): conﬂict between i1, i3 and i2
3 12. − ∂πG1s(i)B2r( j)s (a12): conﬂict between i1, i6 and i3
3 13. − ∂π B1s(i)s (a13): conﬂict between i1, i7 and i2
3 14. − ∂π B1i s (a14): conﬂict between i1, i9 and i2
Notice that the facts B1r( j)(reliable(i)), B
1
r( j)(sincere(i)), B
1
s(i)(trusting( j)) guarantee that i10, i12, and i14 are inapplicable,
thus allowing us to use i9, i11, and i13 and obtain i’s and j’s private beliefs that s is the case: consider some relevant
derivations in Table 2 (let us omit there the failures in triggering i10, i12, and i14 and focus on the positive conclusions).
Example 6 (Example 5 reframed). We continue the previous example and reframe it a bit by adopting the point of view of
the addressee j. Assume now that j privately and non-defeasibly believes that ¬s, thus rule i13 is defeated. At this point j
decides to inform i about his beliefs. Since i trusts more j on s than his belief, he adopts s privately and retracts at time 3
his assertion.
Facts: utter j,i(informr( j),s(i)(¬s,2),2)
retracts(i),r( j)(informs(i),r( j)(s,1),3),
B2s(i)(reliable( j)), B
2
s(i)(sincere( j)), B
2
s(i)(trusting(i))
Rules: l3 :⇒π B1i s
l4 :→π B1j¬s
Consider the relevant derivations in Table 3.
4.2. Request
Analogously to inform, we deﬁne the preconditions and effects of a request communicative act, used in deliberation
dialogues, by rules Rreq = {r1, . . . , r13}, with priority r2 	 r1, r7 	 r6, r9 	 r8, r11 	 r10 and r13 	 r12. For space reasons,
we do not explicitly model preconditions of actions, so compared to FIPA, we have to simplify the deﬁnitions. Again, the
cooperative behavior is the default, which is overruled when the agent refuses the request, or when there is evidence that
the agent is insincere, or non-cooperative.
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r1 uttera,b
(
request(s, t), t
) ⇒τ requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)
r2 retracta,b
(
requestr(a),r(b)(s, t), t
′)τ ¬requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)
Feasibility preconditions and rational effect. The precondition of a request is that the speaker does not believe in advance that
the hearer wants already to perform the requested action. The rational effect is that the speaker wants to achieve s and
that the hearer achieves it.
r3 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t) →π Gtr(a)s
r4 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t) →τ ¬Bt−1r(a)Gtr(b)s
r5 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t) →π Gtr(a)Gtr(b)s
Success conditions. If the hearer does not explicitly refuse the request he is assumed to publicly adopt the requested goal
(but not necessarily privately). Again this is a defeasible assumption which can be retracted in front of an explicit refusal.
r6 Gtr(a)G
t
r(b)s ⇒π Gtr(b)s
r7 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t), refuser(b),r(a)(s, t
′)τ ¬Gt′r(b)s
Bridge to private mental attitudes. Depending on the agent type attributed by the hearer to the speaker different inferences
can be made about public and private goals of both of them. If the speaker is believed to be sincere, then he is held to want
also privately what he publicly requested. If the hearer is cooperative he will also adopt privately the goal of the requestee.
r8 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t) ⇒τ Gtas
r9 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬Gtas
r10 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t),G
t
r(b)s ⇒π Gtbs
r11 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t),G
t
r(b)s, B
t
r(a)¬cooperative(b)τ ¬Gtbs
r12 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t),G
t
r(a)G
t
r(b)s ⇒π GtaGtbs
r13 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t), B
t
r(b)¬sincere(a)τ ¬GtaGtbs
In this paper we do not discuss the limited persistence of effects of requests, as envisaged in scenario 3 which are not
accepted by a hearer.
4.3. Abstract communicative acts: inform-if
Like in FIPA, we can also handle abstract communicative acts, like inform-if a,b(s, t) which is composed of the nondeter-
ministic choice of informa,b(s, t) and informa,b(¬s, t). Note that in FIPA inform-if is an abstract action which cannot directly
be executed:
ii1 informr(a),r(b)(s, t) →τ inform-if r(a),r(b)(s, t)
ii2 informr(a),r(b)(¬s, t) →τ inform-if r(a),r(b)(s, t)
Thus, we can deﬁne query-if as a request to inform-if :
qi1 query-if r(a),r(b)(s, t) →τ requestr(a),r(b)
(
inform-if r(b),r(s)(s, t
′), t
)
To satisfy the request, the receiver has to execute either an informr(b),r(s)(s, t
′) or an informr(b),r(s)(¬s, t′).
4.4. Persuasion dialogues
ACLs are usually studied in relation to speciﬁc dialogue types, such as cooperative information exchange, negotiation or
persuasion (see, e.g., [32]). We can extend the previous rules with persuasion, by deﬁning acts like challenge and concede,
besides the retract discussed above. A single communicative act like inform may have different semantics, in different types
of dialogue. This is due to different background assumptions, for example regarding sincerity, cooperativity, or trust. Thus,
in non-cooperative dialogue types like persuasion or negotiation (see Example 1), it is possible to reverse the general
principle of rules i6–i14, that cooperative behavior is expected by default, but can be overruled by evidence to the contrary.
Alternatively, we can follow the principle that “silence means consent”. In a persuasion dialogue, the hearer is assumed to
believe what the speaker said (rule i′7 below), unless he explicitly challenges the proposition (rule i′′7 below), thus defeating
the conclusion that he believes the content of the inform.
i′7 G
t
r(a)B
t
r(b)s ⇒π Btr(b)s
i′′ inform (s, t), challenge (s, t′)τ ¬Bt s7 r(a),r(b) r(b),r(a) r(b)
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that he now believes s, but that he no longer believes the opposite. For example, the concession blocks the agent from
performing an inform that ¬s later in the interaction:
c1 conceder(a),r(b)(s, t) →π ¬Btr(a)¬s
So for persuasion, the rules Rinf are altered as follows:
Rpersuasion =
(
Rinf \ {i7, i9, i10, i11, i12, i13, i14}
) ∪ {i2, i′7, i′′7, c1
}
where i′′7 	 i′7. Rules bridging public and private mental attitudes are removed, since from a debate it does not follow that
the interactants believe what they were not able to defend with a counterargument.
5. Related work
Other papers went in the same direction of redeﬁning FIPA semantics: e.g., [4–6,11,26,31]. Like us, most of them distin-
guish between public and private mental attitudes. There are various differences.
Like in [4–6], the distinguishing feature of our approach is that the public mental attitudes attributed to agents during
the dialogue are associated with roles. However, we use roles to redeﬁne the FIPA semantics in a non-monotonic framework
based on TDL which allows us to extend FIPA to persuasion dialogue. We distinguish interactive roles, such as speaker,
(over)hearer and addressee. Clearly, different constitutive rules apply to speaker and hearer. Further, we could add rules
so that the effects of implicit acknowledgement differ between the addressee of a message, and a mere overhearer [12].
Because social roles are associated with dialogue types, with speciﬁc sets of dialogue rules, roles allow us to reason about
assumptions in different kinds of dialogues. E.g., sincerity could be assumed in cooperative dialogues, such as information
exchange, but not in non-cooperative dialogues, such as persuasion or negotiation. Ostensible beliefs and the grounding
operator distinguish only interactive roles or different groups of agents.
The importance of roles is recognized in multiagent systems and their function ranges from attributing responsibilities
to assigning powers to agents in organizations. Other solutions, instead, need to add to dialogue new theoretical concepts
which are not always completely clear or diverge from existing work. In particular, [11] use an explicit grounding operator,
which only partially overlaps with the tradition of grounding in theories of natural language dialogue. Opinions [26] are in-
troduced speciﬁcally for modelling dialogue, but with no relation with persuasion and argumentation. Finally, commitments
in [31] overlap with obligations.
Moreover, the approaches relate to the well known FIPA semantics in different degrees: [12] and [26] try to stay close to
the original semantics, as we do, while [31] substitute it entirely with a new semantics, which, among other things, does not
consider preconditions of actions. [11] and [26] use modal logic, and [31] use CTL. They thus use more common frameworks,
but they do not consider the computational properties of their proposals. Moreover, most of the other approaches do not
consider the persistence of preconditions and effects, an essential point when dealing with actions and their effects. Time
introduces most of the complexities in our formal system, but time is crucial for agent communication, because speech acts
are uttered one after the other, but their effects on mental attitudes are persistent.
6. Summary
We used TDL to study non-monotonicity and time in role-based agent communication. Non-monotonicity occurs in
reasoning about the persistence of FPs and REs of speech acts. Whereas FIPA makes strong assumptions about the private
states, the alternative of using public mental attitudes does not make any assumptions about them; using non-monotonic
reasoning we can make inferences about the private mental attitudes of the agents which hold only by default and can
always be revised. Finally, non-monotonicity can be used for challenges, concessions, and retractions. E.g., an inform is
accepted—its content becomes part of the public beliefs of the addressee—unless it is challenged.
Future work include passing from what-if analysis to planning, and increasing the expressiveness of the framework, for
example to model nested rules to cope with speech acts like proposals which in FIPA is modelled as an inform with a
conditional intention as content.
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